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Abstract 
Money laundering entails a highly rapid scheme of multiple transactions run-
ning within seconds the course of the world. Due to the clandestine origin of money 
laundering, its estimation becomes highly complex and extremely time consuming, 
thus the existence of an accurate model is highly impossible. Moreover, factors such as 
technological advances, rapid development in financial information systems and the 
existence non-cooperative multinational banking entities that ensures anonymity and 
full disclosure to the customer makes such estimations even more impossible. Thus, in 
this working paper, a spherical model including macroeconomic, sociocultural, govern-
ance and corruption components has been implemented in order to capture every es-
sence related to money laundering. By utilizing and modifying Jones’s model of earn-
ings management and quality, we end up in a new set of approaches portraying the 
inclinations and red flags towards the presence of money laundering. An application in 
the European Union will be considered as to test and export crucial conclusions regard-
ing the presence of money laundering in European Union. 
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Introduction 
Financial crimes, also referred as white collar crimes, are defined as nonviolent 
crimes with the sole purpose of achieving financial gains through fraud or embezzle-
ment. Financial crimes seem to be considered as less important due to the absence of 
violence, however they can potentially have huge impact on personal finance or even 
to entire financial markets. Money laundering is defined as the process carried out in 
order to disguise or cancel out the true origin or source of entitlement to money or 
property through criminal activities. The aforementioned process is the consequence 
of almost any illegal activity, with its sole purpose to generate profits. Money launder-
ing takes place secretly hence, it cannot be accurately measured, however it is esti-
mated that, every year, almost 600bil. $ are laundered through the financial institu-
tions. By the time illicit money has been placed, layered and integrated into a financial 
system, the identification and separation between licit and illicit money becomes ex-
tremely complex. Consequently, the adequacy of every model proposed in the availa-
ble literature is difficult to be assessed. 
To fully understand the struggle of revealing such crimes we, first, have to look 
at their common characteristics 
 The first major characteristic is the limited visibility due to the offenders 
being in the area of the crime and as a result, skillfully covering their 
tracks. 
 Another issue is the complexity. Forensic accountants are deceived by 
the originators of financial crimes that use their existing general 
knowledge and exploit the technical knowledge of the systems, used by 
the company, along with the vagueness of the law, as to achieve their 
personal gains. 
 The third issue is the diffusion of victimization. A common example is 
the rolling scams where apart from the offenders, it involves individuals, 
"victims", who out of necessity, become part in criminal schemes, with 
or without their knowledge that they are committing a financial crime. 
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 Considering all the above, the most important hindrance to reveal such 
crimes is the difficulty of investigation due to the large volume and 
complexity of transactions, a key feature that appears mainly on finan-
cial exchange markets, the rare leak of inside information and the lim-
ited availability of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) resources. 
 Anti-Money Laundering procedures are not sufficient in developed 
countries. For example, the 2005 bombings of London’s Public Trans-
portations were financed through legal channels by incorporating and 
issuing transactions that amounted in less than 4.500 pounds each. On 
the other hand, developing countries where the transportations of large 
sum of money are quite unusual, such transactions could be “caught” if 
the proper protocol was followed. 
Taking into account the Wien and Palermo Conventions, money laundering, 
may encompass three areas:  
(i) the conversion or transfer, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime 
(ii)  the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement or ownership of rights with respect to property, knowing that 
such property is the proceeds of crime 
(iii) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of the re-
ceipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime. 
The FATF (Financial Action Task Force), established in 1989 by the G7 members, 
is the policy-initiating body, that has the purpose of setting the standards, facing the 
problem of money laundering and finance of terrorism (AML/CTF) and supporting their 
implementation. The cornerstone of the initiatives of FATF is called “The Forty Recom-
mendations” *. Among them, are included some of the most crucial to the process, 
approaches known as Know Your Client (“KYC”) and Customer Due Diligence (“CDD”) 
approach. 
 Effects of money laundering and high scale of global terrorism have shaken the 
foundation of business environment. The Know Your Client approach, a critical 
area for any institution, underlines the need of transparency between the in-
volving parties of a transaction. Every transaction in the financial system must 
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be able to be traced back to an identifiable individual. As obvious is the need 
for this kind of approach, as perpetrating is its limitation. For instance, both 
Hines (2010) and Sharman (2010) point out that offenders could set up anony-
mous shell companies in a noncooperative area or territory (NCCT), resulting in 
setting up, in banking secrecy, anonymous bank accounts.  
 A further step forward as to ensure the trustworthiness of the client is the Cus-
tomer Due Diligence (“CDD”) approach. In connection to KYC approach where, 
through the local Customer Identification Program (“CIP”), basic personal de-
tails such as the name, identification and date of birth are obtained, in CDD a 
more strenuous control is in place. The turning point of CDD is to cross-check 
the received information, verify it and determine the credibility of the client. In 
case the previous steps are not efficient enough, Enhanced Due Diligence 
(“EDD”) takes place, where sources from intelligence offices are gathered in or-
der to eliminate the risk of the institution being used as a mean of money laun-
dering. 
 
In contrast to the popular trend in legitimate commercial activities where the 
use of cash is constantly marginalized, the largest proportion of revenue generated by 
illegal activities continues to be channeled in the form of cash in bank accounts at vari-
ous financial institutions in order to convert them to legal values and to integrate into 
“legal” economies. This “anomaly” is accustomed to one thing and only: The anonymi-
ty that transactions in the form of cash guarantees. Banknotes exchanged from hand 
to hand, without any trace, reduces the degree of transparency.  
Thus, in this working paper, we are going to formulate an econometric model 
based on Jones’s Earnings Quality model (1991), but alternated and adapted so as to 
depict a less biased and more accurate estimation, in order to provide an answer re-
garding the inclinations and components in reducing or enlarging Money Laundering. 
Later, we will apply this model to the 28 E.U. countries and expect to find the proclivity 
of certain nations towards criminal activities and more specifically money laundering. 
The structure of the paper is the following. At first stage, Chapter 1 will be 
based on the telltale signs of money laundering. The general concept of how placing, 
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layering and integrating are taking place, would be fully explained accompanied with 
additional information and examples. Chapter 2 will entail the explanation of the new 
approach to measure money laundering. We would define the hypothesis as to struc-
ture a solid and adaptive model that tries to consider not only economic and macroe-
conomic components but also social and cultural inclinations based on the diverseness 
that European Union provides. As a result, we will face the challenge to capture the 
general concept of money laundering from every possible angle.  Cultural and social 
components, will cross out any arbitrary biased hypotheses and will ensure more accu-
rate results. Undeniably, the most difficult part would be to distinguish “dirty” money 
components within the cash inflows. As a result, the model would also include control 
independent variables linked to activities coming from either official or shadow econ-
omy activities. Besides these, factors such as unemployment rate, anti-money launder-
ing legislation, corruption and expenditure on education that is highly related with the 
scale of electronic payments will be considered. Chapter 3 will present the construc-
tion of the model along with the process followed and the econometric analysis. Mul-
tiple geographical, economic and cultural sets will be considered as to extrapolate on 
the inclinations of every European Union Economy towards Money Laundering.  As a 
sample, we will utilize data generated from each of the 28 E.U. countries for the period 
from 2005 to 2014. Datasets will entail information based on excessive search in online 
search engines, World’s Bank/IMF/Eurostat/European Data Warehouse databases, 
Governmental and other reports or assessments. The dataset will be processed and 
interpreted by utilizing the STATA Software. Chapter 4 will include the summary and 
the conclusion concerning the work undertaken and its respective results.  
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Telltale Signs of Money Laundering 
Financial institutions around the world are constantly facing the issue of illicit 
money entering their circulation systems. Implemented measures seems to slow down 
but not eliminate the phenomenon. The next chapter focuses on the processes that 
illicit proceeds go through as to be laundered and become legal.  
Money Laundering Phases 
  The primary objective of money laundering sourced from criminal activities, is 
to prevent their disclosure and consequently the conversion of assets, mainly those of 
criminal origin. However, this is not the sole objective. Simply hiding the cash does not 
offer something beneficial to the perpetrator, because in order to exploit, use for per-
sonal gain or invest the money, these proceeds should be laundered and pumped, as 
“legitimate”, in the economy. The systematization which is widely accepted by both 
American and European theory is the one which resulted from the report of the US 
customs service and is based on the separation, in three stages, of money laundering 
process by criminal activities. What is more, considering Schneider and Windischbauer 
(2008), the following processes are the most commonly in place. 
Step 1: Placement 
  This is the stage where cash is pumped and mixed with legitimate funds or is 
simply deposited in financial institutions. According to Andelman D. (1994) this is a 
high-risk phase due to the fact that the detection of off-balance sheet cash can be 
tracked more easily by the supervisory bodies. Upon completion of this stage, the pro-
ceeds of crime are no longer in form of cash.  
The placement of the proceeds can be executed in multiple ways and means. Some of 
the most commonly known approaches are the following 
 “Smurfing” is the act of breaking down illicit funds into smaller, below the 
threshold (somewhere around 9.000$ depending on the regulations) transac-
tions, as to avoid the obligatory declaration of the transaction, to the reporting 
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authorities, or a probable investigation regarding the source of funds. The 
items used for these transactions have to be highly liquid (bank drafts, cheques 
or depositions in saving accounts) due to the high risk of detection.  
 A further commonly known technique is the use of “straw-man”. The role of 
the straw-man is to lend his identity for multiple purposes (obtain loan or buy 
real estate) in order to keep the anonymity and conceal the real owner and 
origin of the funds.  
 This stage also includes the "physical" border transport of banknotes. 
 Other major red-flag areas that are highly affected by money-laundering 
schemes are, the repayment of loans, the betting on sport events or the blend 
of illicit with legitimate funds through daily routine events(receipts) mostly on 
cash-based and service-providing business (also known as front business) such 
as restaurants, bars and casinos.  
Step 2: Layering 
  Layering is defined as the separation of illicit proceeds from their source by 
creating a network of financial transactions designed to cover the original trace and 
ensure anonymity (Bank Of England, 1990). In this stage, criminals try to conceal the 
true origin of cash. By utilizing a complex matrix of transactions based on increased 
intensity and speed (e.g. multiple electronic transactions and transfers) criminals try to 
decouple cash from their origin. For example, cash could be transferred, by utilizing 
accounting, to an international financial center (e.g. tax heaven, off-shore bank), 
which, above all, ensures anonymity and discretion.  
Step 3: Integration 
  The final stage regarding the process of money laundering is the integration. In 
this stage, the proceeds of illegal activities are integrated in the financial system after 
having acquired legitimacy. By simply hiding cash, offenders will only be protected by 
law enforcement authorities for a short term. It is obvious that this single and simple 
concealment of illicit proceeds would serve the principle goal of protecting themselves 
from prosecution. However, the risk of physical loss, and the imperative need of in-
vesting these revenues, lead the offenders to channel and integrate them into legiti-
mate financial and economic systems. The desirable outcome, in addition, is the illegal 
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income to acquire a “lawful-like” status, in order to be exploited or invested in future 
activities without a trace of shade. As a result, the ultimate aim of concealing the crim-
inal origin of the funds and their legalization is served only by constantly pumping 
them in financial markets. 
 
A new approach 
Exploring the impact of money laundering in a country’s economy is a rather 
difficult and newly-researched field of economics. Academics point out that pioneering 
generated data was mostly based on tacit knowledge or feelings rather than actual ob-
servations thus, making the results scientifically doubtful. (e.g. Walker 1999, Barone 
and Masciandaro 2011). Further limitations are related to the available literature and 
resources available. First of all, the assessment of money laundering through criminal 
activities is almost exclusively limited to drug trafficking, even though criminal organi-
zations engage in more, than this, activities. Moreover, recent studies are based on 
data generated from the calibration of theoretical models rather than actual data, 
which means that money laundering is often confused and mixed with shadow econ-
omy, two concepts related but not identical.   
Money laundering is not an observable content, thus it is quite hard to esti-
mate. However, the one component that is always observable and closely related to 
money laundering is the flows of cash and more specifically cash deposited in regulat-
ed financial institutions. As financial institutions are not tracing the source of money at 
the moment of deposition, cash could be sourced from numerous legal or illegal activi-
ties.. Taking every aspect into consideration, this working paper is proposing a new 
approach that will capture money laundering from every angle. For this purpose, we 
will borrow the model based on the discretionary accruals, also referred as the Jones 
Model of earnings quality. The model portraits a linear estimate of the earnings of a 
firm (a nation’s in the current working paper) given several covariates and uses the er-
rors from the model (the unexplained component) as the level of earnings manage-
ment and quality. So, the first step would be a demonstration of the cash balances the 
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way they were expected to be and then, a comparison with the actual reports. The dif-
ference between the expected and the actual amounts will be an indication of Money 
Laundering component.   
 
Hypothesis Statement 
As described above, money laundering is an extremely complex procedure and 
consequently several multidimensional factors should be taken into consideration. Be-
sides the obvious macroeconomic factors that affects the yearly inflows of every na-
tion, factors such as the political stability and corruption, the tendency for criminal acts 
and the social and cultural conditions of every nation could affect and pressure the of-
fender to engage in such activities. Finally, certain adjustments should be made in or-
der to include a wider range covering the whole European Union. Some of the hypoth-
eses stated below might seem too simplistic. However, as obvious are the hypotheses 
as important is their outcome as to ensure the stability of the baseline of the model. 
Criminal activities vary in form, outcome, means of action and benefits. Fur-
thermore, as the model involves the members of the European Union, we assume that 
the basis of the Anti-Money Laundering regulations would be if not the same, closely 
similar. 
Macroeconomic Components 
The first series of hypotheses involve the most crucial macroeconomic factors 
that affect and could potentially put the balance of a nation in jeopardy. Those factors 
cannot be ignored due to their importance and significance on the financial system 
Besides money laundering components our model estimates components that 
are sourced from the legal motivations of offenders to commit such crimes. Deploying 
socioeconomic habits varying between nations we could derive to some very interest-
ing results regarding money laundering. Considering socioeconomics turmoil through-
out Europe especially during the latter years, we expect countries facing a financially 
uncertain period to have lower scores in macroeconomic statistics and additionally 
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higher penetration of corruption to their system. Initiating the first set of variables, 
one such component is the gross domestic product. The GDP is the standard measure 
as to gauge a country’s economic health. By achieving a positive growth, nations, can 
enjoy prosper and financial stability, thus making the need to engage in criminal activi-
ties (in particular, money laundering) less appealing. As a result, we can state the first 
hypothesis of the model: 
H1: The higher the GDP, the less population is engaging in criminal activities 
thus, the less money is laundered.   
Another substantial component is the level of unemployment rate at each na-
tion. The unemployment rate can reveal the level of economic development nation-
wide. Higher levels of unemployment rate mean that generated income is concentrat-
ed and distributed to higher income classes in contrast to lower income classes. Clas-
ses where people still rely, mainly, on the use of cash for their transactions. 
H2: The higher the unemployment rate in a nation, the higher the use of cash, 
the higher the presence of money laundering in the financial system. 
The next crucial macroeconomic factor that could hint an extensive existence 
of money laundered in a national financial system is the inflation rates.  Since we are 
considering the gains of making illicit proceeds, legal, we should also consider the on-
ward gains or benefits from investing actions. More specifically, nations and especially 
developing ones, can become attractive financial heavens to offenders, leading them 
to a short-term financial growth. However, major consequences can occur from such 
actions. The lack of stable long-term investments and growth can destabilize the finan-
cial system. The economic system can potentially erode (an underlying “bubble” would 
be created), for a short term, leading to a higher demand for cash, making the interest 
rates extremely volatile and causing a high inflation on the domestic products. Thus, 
we can state that the existence of high inflation rate, especially in counter-fashion to 
GDP’s growth can point to inflows of illegally sourced money in the financial system. As 
a result: 
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H3: The higher and more unexplained the inflation rate, the higher the chance 
of “dirty money” in the system. 
An additional macroeconomic component that is highly related to dominant 
markets is the ratio of imports to exports of goods and services as a GDP’s percentage. 
The hypothesis behind this assumption is that dominant markets tend to import in-
vestment goods, thus the deficit created in the accounts, is expected to be positively 
correlated to high exports as well. On the other hand, weaker markets tend to import 
consumption goods, creating an issue of hard currency volatility and being unable to 
fulfill their obligations towards their creditors.  
H4: The lower or closer to balance the ration of imports to exports is, the less is 
the presence of money laundering in the system. 
The last macroeconomic component that will be added as to complete the 
baseline model is the Foreign Direct Investments. It is obvious to state that Money 
Laundering is a global issue. Cross-national transactions and investments are fast and 
easily succeeded these days. As a result cash inflows sourced from foreign investments 
could reveal a certain volume of illicit money pumped into the system. The current 
global assumptions are parted in two approaches. The first approach is that countries 
under the influence of criminal groups tend not to be trusted by foreign creditors and 
as a result the volume of the foreign direct investments would be much lower. The 
second approach is that countries, and especially the ones in non-cooperative territo-
ries or with lax regulatory environment, tend to attract “shady” investments due to 
their clandestine and non-transparent nature thus having an increased volume of for-
eign direct investments. As a result, a combination of indexes should be displayed as to 
structure a solid hypothesis. 
H5: The higher the regulatory effectiveness of a nation, the higher the transpar-
ency of the investments in a nation, thus the less illicit money will be pumped into the 
financial system. 
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World Governance Indicator Components 
Where delinquency and corruption flourishes, the Rules of Law fail, said the Ex-
ecutive Director of the United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime, Mr. Yury Fedotov, in 
2012. Worldwide Governance Indicators are a prime example of the deep penetration 
of corruption, or incompetence, of the government to implement basic principles, 
used as a safeguard against arbitrary governance of the officials (LexisNexis). The mod-
el proposed in this working paper, wants to capture every aspect related to money 
laundering and consequently we will borrow the aforementioned indicators as to make 
a more spherical model. Constitutional economics can suggest that, weak Worldwide 
Governance Indicator figures can depict the proclivity of certain individuals to engage 
in criminal actions, in comparison to strong figures where no one is considered above 
the law (Leff 1964, Huntington 1968). 
In terms of the indexes used, the World Bank has established the World Gov-
ernance Indicators encompassing six dimensions that measures the level of adherence 
of a nation to these Rules. The estimated values vary somewhere between -2.5, been 
the worst outcome and +2.5 been the best outcome. In particular, these factors are 
presented with their respective hypothesis, as follows: 
Control of Corruption 
Control of Corruption is described as the abuse of public office for personal 
gain (United Nations). It entails a range of criminal offering from petty to grand gains. 
High levels of corruption can hinder the growth of a nation. In relation to Rules of Law, 
corruption is considered as a serious impediment to national development. As a result 
it is fair to state that:  
H6: The lower the indicator of Control for Corruption, the higher the presence of 
money laundered in the financial system. 
Government Effectiveness 
Using the Government Effectiveness Index, we want to investigate and com-
pare the effectiveness of not only the quality of public and civil services, but also the 
credibility of the government to such commitments. More specifically, focusing on the 
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given variations between nations and we can draw upon conclusions regarding not on-
ly the effectiveness of the government but also the impact the financial crisis had, on 
the formulation and implementation of such policies. As a result, 
H7: Nations under memorandums or IMF’s supervision tend to score lower on 
GE Index, thus the presence of money laundering will be higher. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
One of the most unfamiliar, within the European Borders, indicator. Besides 
sporadic unfortunate events, EU is almost sterilized by terrorist or extremely politically 
violent actions.  As an indicator related to money laundering, it captures the penetra-
tion of criminal groups that could ultimately destabilize or overthrown the govern-
ment. 
H8: The lower the indicator of Political Stability and Absence of Vio-
lence/Terrorism, the higher the presence of criminal groups in cornerstone positions, 
thus the higher the presence of money laundering in nation. 
Regulatory Quality 
Regulatory Quality is a crucial indicator that generally lowers or even disap-
pears the presence of money laundered.  It captures the ability of the government to 
implement and formulate sound and effective policies. It also reveals the respect of 
the public towards socioeconomic institutions that governs the nation. As a result, we 
expect to see a tendency where people that trust the local policies and institutions will 
not engage, or fear to engage, in criminal actions, thus: 
H9: The higher the respect towards the public policies and institutions, the low-
er the presence of money laundering in the nation. 
Rule of Law 
In connection to the previous indicator, Rule of Law encompass the confidence 
that persons, institutions and public or private entities, including the State itself have 
in the established laws. Moreover, it shows the level of abide towards them. It also in-
cludes the quality of the enforcement and police bodies. As a result, high indicators 
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would probably lead to small percentage of criminal activities and even smaller in the 
area of money laundering thus: 
H10: The higher the Rule of Law indicator the lower the presence of civilians en-
gaging in money laundering activities. 
Voice and Accountability 
Criminal organizations can invest and control various aspect of the social life of 
a nation.  Voice and Accountability measures the level of freedom of expression and 
speech, as well as, the extent to which the citizens are able to participate in activities 
such as voting for a candidate party. Furthermore, such factor accounted from a risk-
analysis perspective, have been proved to be closely connected with risk of corruption 
leading to money laundering (FATF 2011), as “elites” could potentially “influence” the 
effective functioning of Anti-Money Laundering Reporting or other supervisory author-
ities. The index, among further hypothesis, can result in some very interesting out-
comes due to the connection of control of the media to criminal activities and pro-
ceeds. As a result: 
H11: The higher the indicator of Voice and Accountability the less the presence 
of money laundering in the nation. 
Sociocultural Components 
The sociocultural perspective of the model tries to eliminate any biased results 
occurring only by including the previous indexes. Every country across the European 
Union faces its peculiar problems and challenges. By considering the cultural effects on 
nations, one could explain why some, in paper, similar countries are doing better than 
the other. Subsequently, the third dataset will entail cultural components closely re-
lated to the finance of education, the inequality and such factors that, in the absence 
of, can push an individual to engage in criminal activities. 
Expenditure on Education 
The first cultural component is the expenditure on education concentrated by 
the % of GDP. Studies (World Bank 2005) have revealed that higher educated, or finan-
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cially literate, individuals tend to enjoy higher income and, subsequently, tend to trust 
alternative ways of payment that eliminates the use of cash, thus lowering money 
laundering. Moreover, financially literate individuals tend to lack the characteristic of 
narrow self-interest. To support the claim, recent studies (Gregory Clark 2009) docu-
ment that on a downturn, modern technology or even sufficient capital, alone, will not 
be able to revive and boost an economy. As a result:  
H12: Τhe higher the expenditure on Education, the higher the public literacy 
thus, the lower the presence of money laundering in a nation. 
GINI Coefficient 
Corrado Gini, an Italian statistician, was the first to research and implement a 
coefficient that measures the inequality of income/wealth distribution. The main idea 
behind this component is that, the more equal the distribution of income in every so-
cial class is, the lower the index will be. Inequality is one of the major factors that af-
fects and increases the tendency of an individual to engage in criminal activities. Beck-
er (1968) has created a model trying to explain the created socioeconomic gap and re-
sulted in that the wider the distribution gap is, the more proceeds from criminal activi-
ties are perceived. However, recent studies have claimed that crime rates and wealth 
distribution is less of a matter of inequality and more of the level of how much individ-
uals flaunt their riches (Daniel Hicks and Joan Harmony Hicks, 2014). Considering our 
model, by adding the current index, we expect to find a positive correlation between 
low GINI index and absence of money laundering. As a result: 
H13: The lower the GINI index, the lower the presence of money laundering in a 
nation. 
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
In addition to popular belief, poverty is the major factor that drives individual 
to criminal acts. The presented component does not measure the inequality of wealth 
distribution like the above factor, but the low income and low working intensity in 
comparison to the rest residents of a nation. Taking into consideration all the above 
we can conclude that in order to avoid the risk of poverty, low income classes, will be 
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easier inclined to pursuit proceeds from criminal activities and as a result we can state 
the next hypothesis.  
H14: The higher the rate of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the 
higher the crime rates thus, the higher the presence of money laundering. 
Detection Components 
Regulatory Efficiency 
Since the basic actions as to gain illegal proceeds have been set, now, we must 
consider the probability of the actions being detected by the supervisory authorities. 
Taking into account, the Basel Accord, the forty Regulations of the FATF, European 
Commissions Regulations on Anti-Money Laundering Reporting and the proposals from 
Bank of Greece, every transaction that is known or even suspected, regardless if it is 
currently in place or has already occurred, that has the probability of laundering mon-
ey, should be reported for further investigation to the local authorities. As a result, 
strict and efficient regulatory controls would refrain individuals from engaging in crim-
inal activities, thus: 
H15: The higher the efficiency of regulatory bodies in a country, the less money 
are attempted to be laundered through financial institutions, the less money are effec-
tively laundered, thus the presence of laundered money in an institution will be lower. 
 
Corruption Perception Index 
The current index, first launched in 1995, have been created in order to meas-
ure the level of public corruption of a nation or as the Transparency International de-
fines it “the misuse of public power for private benefit”. Corruption can become a criti-
cal barrier towards the economical and general growth of a nation. High levels of cor-
ruption could reveal the ease of individuals to engage in criminal activities without hes-
itation resulting in the following hypothesis: 
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H16: The lower the Corruption Perception Index, the higher the presence of 
money laundering in a nation. 
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Econometric Analysis 
A thorough explanation of the structure of the model and the datasets, along 
with the estimation techniques and its limitations, will be given in the following chap-
ter. 
Model, Data and Technique 
The econometric model is completed in two stages. The tested data is struc-
tured as a panel of the 28 European Union countries observed over the period 2005-
2014. For every country included in the final data, we have acquired all the necessary 
indexes and information required for the proper testing and functioning of the model.  
Structure of the Model 
The main inspiration towards the construction of the model is derived from 
Jones(1991) discretionary accruals model and the modified Jones’s model(1995). 
Jennifer Jones, the creator of the model, developed it during her doctoral thesis in 
early 1990. The purpose of the model is to study the quality of a firm’s (nation’s in the 
particular situation) earnings. The main hypothesis is that the accrual part of earnings 
should be connected and explain growth in revenues and tangible assets. Higher level 
of accruals if not accompanied with corresponding earnings are proved to offer lower 
quality earnings. Managers, using their discretion, could influence and manipulate 
fundamental accounting methods used to recognise earnings, as to show an increased 
performance of the firm. As a result, Jones, focused on dividing the accruals in two 
components. The first component would include the accruals which are sourced using 
the fundamental accounting methods in the recognition of earnings (non-discretionary 
accruals). The second component would include accruals sourced from managerial 
errors, either intentional or unintentional (discretional accruals). In 1995, after 
extended research, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney noted that Jones’s Model did not 
consider changes in receivables as a part to estimate earnings quality. However, as 
accurately proved, growth in receivables is closely associated with growth in revenues, 
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thus receivables should be accounted when the non-discretionary earnings component 
is considered.  
The idea behind the construction of our model is born from Jones’s approach 
and is considering the abnormal earnings. More precisely, we will structure a baseline 
econometric model, making the estimation of how much the Gross Domestic Product 
of a country should be and then compare it with the actual number. The difference of 
those two results would be an indication of something unexplained happening in the 
local accounts. Unluckily, limited information and resources available on specifically 
money laundering components for all the European Union countries for all the tested 
period have limited the scope of the research. However, we hope that this working 
paper would set a new base towards the fight against money laundering and finance of 
terrorism.  
Datasets 
Datasets have been separated in three parts. The macroeconomic components, 
the World Governance Indicator components and the Sociocultural and Corruption 
components. In total 280 observations connected with each of the sixteen compo-
nents will be tested and presented in this working paper. 
Estimation Technique 
In order to get accustomed with the dataset and its variables, the first part of 
the model analysis will present some basic trends as to understand the economic posi-
tion of each nation under the period of scrutiny. All the hypotheses stated above will 
be tested. However further explanation will be focused on the most crucial to money 
laundering outcomes. The rest of the variables and their respective hypotheses will be 
treated as controls. After the implemented tests are completed we will examine each 
of the components significance as to figure out which ones should be added in the final 
model, in order to have make it as accurate as possible.   
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National Trends 
Based on the gathered macroeconomic components, STATA, provide us with 
some first indications towards the economic situation of the European Union countries 
under the tested periods.  Values depicted in amounts (GDP and FDI) where logged as 
to reflect and portrait more clearly the volume of their fluctuations during the years. 
By utilizing the log function, from a statistical perspective, we can make the model ap-
pear linear or at least  transform any curves as to appear more linear. Moreover, when 
variables are positively skewed (long tail at the end), components of the data situated 
on the end, could have a major impact and influence the outcome of the test. Thus, by 
logging the values we eliminate that phenomenon. Lastly, the mean function when ac-
companied with the rest of the test will provide with a wider view as to arrive in more 
accurate results. The next table depicts the mean value of the 28 nations under scruti-
ny. 
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Table 1: Macroeconomic Mean Values 
                                                                                     
United Kingdom         28.879         6.590         2.708         0.964        25.386
        Sweden         27.188         7.590         1.176         0.992        18.488
         Spain         28.228        17.160         2.218         1.087        24.583
      Slovenia         24.834         7.160         2.327         0.876        16.234
      Slovakia         25.462        13.170         2.598         0.975        17.860
       Romania         26.091         6.850         5.412         1.076        22.643
      Portugal         26.423        10.930         1.740         1.009        23.197
        Poland         27.107        10.500         2.546         1.179        23.444
   Netherlands         27.708         4.570         1.770         1.240        26.401
         Malta         23.136         6.490         2.172         1.037        18.691
    Luxembourg         24.939         4.960         2.194         0.878        19.080
     Lithuania         24.655        10.700         3.720         0.833        20.657
        Latvia         24.271        12.170         4.841         1.082        17.271
         Italy         28.648         8.730         1.880         1.198        18.705
       Ireland         26.465         9.930         1.484         1.003        24.691
       Hungary         25.868         9.100         4.162         0.858         9.938
        Greece         26.622        15.370         2.232         0.961        21.664
       Germany         29.136         7.390         1.597         1.347        24.941
        France         28.869         9.030         1.479         0.868        20.260
       Finland         26.514         7.840         1.897         1.059         9.529
       Estonia         24.032         9.250         3.995         1.012        21.651
       Denmark         26.753         5.810         1.895         0.975         9.369
Czech Republic         26.261         6.550         2.312         1.176        23.029
        Cyprus         24.166         8.080         1.878         0.947         8.996
       Croatia         25.043        12.710         2.658         1.079        21.835
      Bulgaria         24.855         9.650         4.488         0.904        22.260
       Belgium         27.160         7.880         1.720         1.068        15.315
       Austria         26.959         5.030         2.083         0.937        18.480
                                                                                     
       Country      mean(gdp)  mean(unem~t)  mean(infl~n)  mean(impo~s)     mean(fdi)
                                                                                     
 
Table 1 depicts the mean values derived from the generated data. By utilizing 
mean we can make some preliminary educated guesses towards the outcome of the 
research as well as a first comparison between the stability and proclivity towards 
criminal activities of the nations.  
As we can see, European powerhouses such as United Kingdom, Germany, Italy 
and France generate the highest GDP volumes across the European Union. Considering 
this indication, we expect to find less presence of money laundering in those nations. 
However, in the current estimation, we should not ignore the role of the population 
and the working force available to these nations. As a result, it would be extremely bi-
ased to concluded in any results considering only the mentioned variable. 
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Regarding unemployment rates, we focus on two trends. Eastern European 
countries (Baltic and Balkan Countries) have higher level of unemployment in compari-
son to the Western ones. A possible explanation here is that Baltic nations, still need 
time to eliminate any remnants left from their communist past (in strict connections to 
financial principles enforced in communist countries), while Balkan countries have suf-
fered wars and totalitarian regimes that negatively affected their growth. The second 
trend pertain the so called “PIIGS” countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and 
Spain). These countries scored higher in unemployment level in comparison to the un-
affected from the financial crisis, rest of Europe. That could be accounted as an indica-
tion towards the effectiveness of the memorandum programs and the austerity 
measures imposed on these nations and, as well as, deliver a first indication of proba-
ble higher levels of money laundering in these nations.  
The first component that we should focus our attention is the inflation. To 
begin with nations outside of the Eurozone [Hungary (Forint), Romania (Leu) and Bul-
garia (Lev)] score the highest inflation rates through the years. The paradox here is 
that the mentioned nations have not enjoyed a major economic growth through the 
tested years in order to explain such large and constant raises. Taking into considera-
tion the tested hypothesis stated in the “Hypotheses Statement” section we should 
note that a red flag, regarding illicit money pumped into the financial system of the 
mentioned nations, could be raised here. On the other hand, nations that joined the 
Eurozone the last few years [Estonia(2011), Latvia(2014), Lithuania(2015)] are ex-
pected to have a constant growth in prices due to the increase in economic power and 
benefits (mostly through bilateral agreements) that the participation in the European 
Union, brings with. 
Considering the imports to exports ration, we can see an almost equal distribu-
tion among the European Union. The mentioned index did not offer a clear indication 
in connection to criminal activities or money laundering and as a result it should not 
and will not be considered in the formulation of the final model.   
Last but not least is the Foreign Direct Investment. The variable as a standalone 
index cannot be interpreted. Prosperous nations such as Cyprus, Denmark and Finland 
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have been affected by the negative foreign direct investments (outflows of invest-
ments).  Especially Cyprus, having suffered the bail in of 2013, saw limited investments 
inflows due to the created uncertainty and additionally, saw large volume of invest-
ments leave the country as investors wanted to protect and invest in some more fi-
nancially stable environments.  The provided outcomes cannot indicate an underlying 
financial anomaly thus, the variable will either be ignored, like the imports to exports 
variable, or tested with further assumptions. 
Macroeconomic Model 
As already stated, in order to formulate the final model, we will initiate, first, a 
two-stages model. The first model that we want to produce will be a baseline macroe-
conomic model in connection to the GDP. Moreover, having provide an introductory 
picture of the first results, the interpretation of the model would become more accu-
rate and logical.  We begin our tests with one of the most popular statistical tech-
niques used by researchers, the linear regression. 
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Table 2: Linear Regression 
                                                                                
         _cons    -111.4188    69.5439    -1.60   0.121    -254.1111    31.27345
          year     .0668741   .0341682     1.96   0.061    -.0032332    .1369815
           fdi     .0138824   .0079155     1.75   0.091    -.0023588    .0301236
importsexports     3.710306   1.387459     2.67   0.013     .8634752    6.557137
     inflation    -.1747081    .051032    -3.42   0.002    -.2794171    -.069999
  unemployment     -.032052   .0495639    -0.65   0.523    -.1337486    .0696447
                                                                                
           gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               Robust
                                                                                
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in Country)
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.4538
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1863
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0003
                                                       F(  5,    27) =    6.87
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     280
 
 
The coefficients of the linear regression reveal that an increase in GDP corre-
lates with an increase in imports and a slight increase in Foreign Direct Investments. As 
a result, from a cash based perspective, such increases that include the usage of cash 
could include funds sourced from money laundering activities. Consequently, we reject 
the first hypothesis stated due to the mentioned example. When tested for signifi-
cance, most of the values result in higher than 0.05 p-values. As a result, they are in-
significant to the dependent variable of the model and their hypotheses should be re-
jected. However, the one thing worth noticing is the low p-value of the inflation index 
that makes it significant. In connection with the assumption established before, infla-
tion seems to play a critical role towards the formulation of the GDP. Arbitrary and un-
explained inflation could hint the existence of underlying illicit proceeds pumped into 
the financial system. What is more by examining the values of the coefficients, infla-
tion has a negative relation with an increase in the GDP. Thus, it is the first indication 
of money laundering in nations influenced from such anomaly. Last but not least, we 
are noticing a low R2. Considering the theory, low R2 indicates that the model does not 
fit well the observations. However, we should not jump to conclusions. As we want to 
predict the human inclination towards money laundering, the unpredictability sourced 
from the human behavior can impact R2 without necessarily proving an unbalanced 
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fitness of the model. So, we have to run extra tests and evaluate R2 in connection with 
its residuals. 
This is the stage where jones’s model and theory are taken into consideration. 
When Arellano-Bond dynamic estimation model was implemented, after running the 
regression we predict and define the residuals in order to ascertain the difference be-
tween the actual and the expected data. Moreover, by running the Arellano-Bond dy-
namic panel data estimation model, we include lags as regressors in order to eliminate 
any endogenous regressors and achieve a higher efficiency of the estimator. Static da-
ta (Fixed or Random effect) would not allow us to interpret data observed in previous 
period. On the other hand, dynamic data can give us current and past information. The 
main reason we chose Arellano-Bond model is that financial inflows such as Foreign 
Direct Investments are assumed to be endogenous thus having a correlation with the 
error term. Moreover, time and geographical components may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Last but not least, the Arellano-bond model was designed for 
panel data that is constructed with a limited timeline(t) dimension (10 years) and wide 
country(N) dimension (28 countries). As a result: 
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Table 3: Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data 
        Standard: _cons
Instruments for level equation
        Standard: D.unemployment D.inflation D.importsexports D.fdi
        GMM-type: L(2/.).gdp
Instruments for differenced equation
                                                                                
         _cons     13.20508   1.139129    11.59   0.000     10.97242    15.43773
           fdi    -.0003241    .000446    -0.73   0.467    -.0011982      .00055
importsexports    -.1454625   .0966292    -1.51   0.132    -.3348523    .0439273
     inflation     .0108312   .0028301     3.83   0.000     .0052843    .0163781
  unemployment    -.0100552   .0023413    -4.29   0.000    -.0146441   -.0054662
                
           L1.     .5074231   .0415951    12.20   0.000     .4258983     .588948
           gdp  
                                                                                
           gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     41               Wald chi2(5)          =    212.35
                                                               max =         8
                                                               avg =         8
                                             Obs per group:    min =         8
Time variable: year
Group variable: Country                      Number of groups      =        28
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       224
 
The differences from the standard regression model portrayed above depict a 
first estimation towards shadow economy and money laundering. The residual of the 
GDP reveal that there is, on average, 0.5 points of unexplained amount inside the GDP 
component. Due to the restricted information availabe, the model cannot disentangle 
the amount to criminal components as to accuretly state that a certain value is 
accustomed to money laundering. However, it can be used as a good proxy for future 
studies in order to end up in more accurate results.  
Second Stage Model 
After completing the bases of our model, we will start considering factors close-
ly related to corruption, shadow economy and most of all, money laundering. At first, a 
correlation matrix will be implemented as to examine the possibility of existence of 
collinear variables, which should not be parted together in the final model, as they 
measure the same trends. As a result:  
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
voiceandac~y     0.3508  -0.7943  -0.5468   0.6033   0.9134   0.9360   0.9124   0.6161   0.8962   0.9454   1.0000
   ruleoflaw     0.2830  -0.7698  -0.5132   0.6266   0.9295   0.9471   0.9450   0.5864   0.9103   1.0000
regulatory~y     0.2433  -0.6646  -0.4503   0.5691   0.8772   0.8879   0.8712   0.5614   1.0000
politicals~i    -0.1604  -0.6057  -0.6453   0.3785   0.5575   0.5703   0.6103   1.0000
government~s     0.2423  -0.7869  -0.5789   0.6760   0.9276   0.9411   1.0000
controlofc~n     0.3173  -0.7116  -0.5076   0.6388   0.9791   1.0000
  corruption     0.3268  -0.7037  -0.5019   0.6174   1.0000
   eduexpend    -0.0030  -0.4364  -0.4059   1.0000
        gini    -0.0565   0.7202   1.0000
riskofsoci~n    -0.2601   1.0000
       resid     1.0000
                                                                                                                 
                  resid riskof~n     gini eduexp~d corrup~n contro~n govern~s politi~i regula~y ruleof~w voicea~y
 
 The first note that we should make here is about the expected negative corre-
lation between the World Governance Indicators and the Sociocultural components. 
As the inequality of wealth distribution or the risk of social inclusion rises, the World 
Governance Indicators drop, meaning that corruption is highly related to the social 
stability of the nation. What is more, expenditure in education is highly related with 
the Governance components. Nations investing in education tend to enjoy a more 
peaceful environment, thus eliminating criminal activities such as money laundering. 
Lastly political stability component is not following, in volume, the trend of the rest 
indicators. An assumption here is that due to the origins of the index, nations enjoying 
financial stability and prosperity are obviously scoring higher results. However, due to 
the exogenous factors such as terrorist attacks, the index does not correlate, in the 
same level, as the rest. As a result, this factor would be also important, if terrorist fi-
nancing components were considered. 
 The next step towards the completion of the final model will be to examine the 
other two datasets (World Governance Indicators and Sociocultural and Corruption 
Components) as to conclude regarding which indexes are the most important in con-
nection to tracing money laundering. 
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Table 5: World Governance Indicators and Sociocultural and Corruption Components 
        Standard: _cons
Instruments for level equation
                  D.regulatoryquality D.ruleoflaw D.voiceandaccountability
                  D.governmenteffectiveness D.politicalstabilityandabsenceofvi
        Standard: D.corruption D.eduexpend D.gini D.riskofsocialexclusion D.controlofcorruption
        GMM-type: L(2/.).resid
Instruments for differenced equation
                                                                                                  
                           _cons     -.041898   .3804617    -0.11   0.912    -.7875893    .7037933
          voiceandaccountability     -.162161   .1622999    -1.00   0.318    -.4802629    .1559409
                       ruleoflaw     .0340461   .0915735     0.37   0.710    -.1454347    .2135268
               regulatoryquality     .0024651   .0673971     0.04   0.971    -.1296309    .1345611
politicalstabilityandabsenceofvi       .06944   .0621572     1.12   0.264    -.0523859     .191266
         governmenteffectiveness     .0021645   .0686995     0.03   0.975    -.1324841    .1368131
             controlofcorruption     .1183249   .0711407     1.66   0.096    -.0211083    .2577581
           riskofsocialexclusion      .001976     .00403     0.49   0.624    -.0059226    .0098746
                            gini     .0079581   .0069818     1.14   0.254    -.0057259    .0216421
                       eduexpend    -.0762998   .0274602    -2.78   0.005    -.1301209   -.0224788
                      corruption     .0193846   .0269175     0.72   0.471    -.0333728     .072142
                                  
                             L1.    -.1282679   .0459045    -2.79   0.005     -.218239   -.0382968
                           resid  
                                                                                                  
                           resid        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                 Robust
                                                                                                  
                                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on Country)
One-step results
                                             Prob > chi2           =    0.0000
Number of instruments =     39               Wald chi2(11)         =     63.45
                                                               max =         7
                                                               avg =         7
                                             Obs per group:    min =         7
Time variable: year
Group variable: Country                      Number of groups      =        28
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation  Number of obs         =       196
 
In similar fashion to the first estimation technique we include all the compo-
nents and by utilizing again the Arellano-Bond estimator. Consequently, we drew upon 
some very interesting results.  First of all, local and international regulations seem to 
play the most crucial part regarding the levels of money laundering in an economy. The 
high p-values can be interpreted as the following way. Governments that have succeed 
in implementing and maintaining highly functional laws (or anti-money laundering 
laws) tend to eliminate the presence of criminal activities or money laundering. More-
over, in connection to laws, efficient regulatory authorities and supervising bodies 
would prompt the public to abstain from criminal activities. As a result, both of our hy-
potheses stated above are significant to the estimation and could be used to formulate 
the final model. What is more, we should note that the residual in this situation is neg-
ative. In other words, the predicted values are higher than the actual ones. Again, this 
is a matter of human characteristics and unpredictability. Due to the fact that this da-
  -28- 
taset is comprised mainly of components related not to economic statistics, but to 
human proclivity, predicted values could be higher than the actual ones. Moreover, a 
large, positive or negative, residual would indicate that the estimation would be poorly 
predicted. What is more, corruption and risk of social inclusion will be added to the 
final model as to make it more considerate and less biased against strictly financial 
components. The rest of the hypotheses did not capture our interest; thus, they will be 
crossed out from the formulation of the model. 
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Model 
Considering the above tests and hypotheses it is time to formulate the final 
model.  Through a series of tests on STATA in order to define the most adequate mod-
el, we drew upon the following results: 
                                                                                         
                  _cons    -1.284122   .4358607    -2.95   0.004    -2.142617   -.4256272
              inflation    -.0609383   .0212595    -2.87   0.005    -.1028121   -.0190645
  riskofsocialexclusion    -.0068886   .0093235    -0.74   0.461    -.0252527    .0114755
             corruption     .2298701   .0799631     2.87   0.004     .0723704    .3873699
governmenteffectiveness    -1.125887   .2397112    -4.70   0.000    -1.598035   -.6537386
 voiceandaccountability     1.287058   .3865322     3.33   0.001     .5257235    2.048393
                                                                                         
                  resid        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                         
       Total     156.61823   251  .623977012           Root MSE      =  .70846
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1956
    Residual    123.469866   246  .501910026           R-squared     =  0.2117
       Model    33.1483637     5  6.62967273           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   246) =   13.21
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     252
 
In the final dataset, we can see that 2 components from the World Governance 
Indicators dataset and one component from each of the rest datasets have been cho-
sen. In econometric terms the final model could be depicted as follow: 
Y = a0  + a1voiceandaccountabilityx + a2govermenteffectivenessx+ a3corruptionx + 
+ a4riskofsocialexclusionx + a5inflationx + et 
P-values seems to predict accurately the coefficients and as a result, the varia-
bles to be statistically significant. The abnormal value of the risk of the social inclusion 
does not prove the inadequacy of the model. On the contrary, as already mentioned, it 
captures the human characteristics perspective as to give a more spherical base to the 
model.  
The next table will present the outcomes and significance of the regressors 
through the years. To formulate the current model, we created a simple linear regres-
sion with clustered standard errors. However, as we wanted to add the yearly estima-
tions we needed to create a lag of the dependent value and the year effects, in order 
to end up with the year dummy variables. As result: 
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Table 6: Linear Regression of the Final Model 
                                                                                         
                  _cons    -.0187113     .01936    -0.97   0.342    -.0584347     .021012
                  yr_10     -.031729   .0166121    -1.91   0.067    -.0658142    .0023563
                   yr_9     .0619572   .0109665     5.65   0.000     .0394557    .0844586
                   yr_8    -.1191275   .0144653    -8.24   0.000    -.1488078   -.0894472
                   yr_7     .0590711   .0121175     4.87   0.000     .0342082    .0839341
                   yr_6     .0329286   .0177037     1.86   0.074    -.0033964    .0692536
                   yr_5    -.1576822   .0197318    -7.99   0.000    -.1981685   -.1171959
                   yr_4            0  (omitted)
                   yr_3     .1052953   .0125502     8.39   0.000     .0795443    .1310463
                   yr_2            0  (omitted)
                   yr_1            0  (omitted)
                         
                    L1.     .9890883   .0024922   396.88   0.000     .9839748    .9942017
                  resid  
                         
 voiceandaccountability     .0338104   .0155531     2.17   0.039     .0018981    .0657226
governmenteffectiveness    -.0043027   .0112338    -0.38   0.705    -.0273527    .0187472
             corruption    -.0018664   .0031596    -0.59   0.560    -.0083493    .0046164
              inflation    -.0065812   .0016972    -3.88   0.001    -.0100637   -.0030988
  riskofsocialexclusion     .0014618   .0003223     4.54   0.000     .0008005    .0021231
                                                                                         
                  resid        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                        Robust
                                                                                         
                                          (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in Country)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .04291
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9972
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 13,    27) =55924.05
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     224
 
We can see that the effects have mostly disappeared due to being absorb by 
the created lags and some year dummies. As a result, we end up with such a high R2. 
Finally, the unexplained component of the GDP (either positive or negative) represents 
parts of the economy outside the official fiscal figures. This is in turn is, partly, ex-
plained by institutional features and characteristics (and lags and year effects). There-
fore, the shadow economy is embedded in the economy of nations and is linked with 
infrastructural - cultural characteristics, not necessarily related to the real economic 
conditions. 
The final table will depict estimations based on the mean scores of the coun-
tries in connection to the accepted hypotheses. From the last table, we will conclude 
to the final assumptions towards the presence of money laundering in European Un-
ion. 
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Table 7: Means of the Final Model per Country 
                                                                                     
United Kingdom          1.335         2.708         1.603         7.920        23.520
        Sweden          1.601         1.176         1.936         9.110        15.540
         Spain          1.084         2.218         1.068         6.380        25.660
      Slovenia          1.027         2.327         1.026         6.230        18.630
      Slovakia          0.923         2.598         0.849         4.600        22.020
       Romania          0.422         5.412        -0.240         3.770        43.780
      Portugal          1.158         1.740         1.036         6.240        25.700
        Poland          0.961         2.546         0.577         4.960        30.970
   Netherlands          1.577         1.770         1.783         8.680        15.660
         Malta          1.178         2.172         1.153         5.780        21.430
    Luxembourg          1.562         2.194         1.673         8.320        17.330
     Lithuania          0.881         3.720         0.772         5.060        32.120
        Latvia          0.779         4.841         0.709         4.740        37.800
         Italy          0.991         1.880         0.398         4.480        26.770
       Ireland          1.392         1.484         1.514         7.500        26.460
       Hungary          0.885         4.162         0.695         5.130        31.220
        Greece          0.828         2.232         0.540         4.060        30.770
       Germany          1.386         1.597         1.588         7.940        19.940
        France          1.260         1.479         1.489         7.090        18.790
       Finland          1.562         1.897         2.147         9.190        17.130
       Estonia          1.087         3.995         1.060         6.580        23.280
       Denmark          1.621         1.895         2.120         9.300        17.420
Czech Republic          0.974         2.312         0.954         4.820        15.720
        Cyprus          1.037         1.878         1.387         6.140        25.420
       Croatia          0.460         2.658         0.600         4.170        32.080
      Bulgaria          0.493         4.488         0.092         3.890        50.890
       Belgium          1.371         1.720         1.589         7.340        21.210
       Austria          1.424         2.083         1.702         7.810        18.620
                                                                                     
       Country   mean(voic~y)  mean(infl~n)  mean(gove~s)  mean(corr~n)  mean(risk~n)
                                                                                     
 
First of all, we will not focus on the inflation component as thorough explana-
tion has been delivered above. Through the interpretation of the above table and in 
connection with the model we can see that three countries stand among the 28 re-
garding the highest proclivity in Money Laundering. Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania did 
not only score low in most of the indexes but also matched the stated hypotheses. For 
example, high corruption with low government effectiveness is a clear indication of 
presence of money laundering activities. Moreover, the scale of people living in the 
risk of social exclusion confirms our assumptions. From an arbitrary statistical perspec-
tive, it is more probable that people living on the edge of poverty or social exclusion 
will engage in larger volume of criminal acts.  What is more, by considering our final 
model the stated hypotheses are correct. Finally, the governmental effectiveness is 
one of the most crucial variables regarding money laundering. Countries that scored 
the lower levels has the higher perpetration of money laundering.   As a result, we can 
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state that it is the government’s responsibility to limit and set strict boundaries if it 
wants to lower or eliminate the phenomenon.
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Conclusions 
 In this working paper, we attempted to calculate the amount of money laun-
dering in European Union Countries. Limited available resources on the subject obli-
gated as to transform our model and change the original orientation. However, as the 
research was in action, the results were becoming clearer and clearer that money 
laundering is not only an economical nature matter of deception but also a matter 
highly connected to human behavior. The researched components could give an indi-
cation towards the presence of money laundering in European Union. The first analysis 
of the macroeconomic baseline model gave an indication of 0.5 points of unexplained 
component in the total GDP. Further analysis confirmed that the absence of variables 
such as voice and accountability or government effectiveness could attract individuals 
in engaging in criminal activities. The macroeconomic component that crosses out any 
biased results is the inflation rate. Unexplained inflation rate with counter-cyclical 
growth in Gross Domestic Product revealed the presence of illicit inflow funds in local 
financial systems. Considering the European Union, we see that Bulgaria, Romania and 
Hungary have the highest presence of Money Laundering. At this point we would like 
to finish this dissertation by hoping that this working paper will be treated as a step-
ping stone towards the construction of an ultimate model that will assist the fight 
against money laundering and corruption in general.  
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Appendix 
This model used a balanced panel data of the 28 European Union Countries 
across ten years from 2005 to 2014. Datasets where created through the utilization of 
different resources. All the information along with sources and definitions are available 
in the excel spreadsheets.  
Linear Regression Model including all World Governance Indicators and Soci-
ocultural and Corruption Components: 
                                                                                                  
                           _cons    -.0195415   1.377304    -0.01   0.989    -2.845535    2.806452
          voiceandaccountability     2.435138   .9620346     2.53   0.017     .4612056     4.40907
                       ruleoflaw    -.3769795   .5831647    -0.65   0.523    -1.573535    .8195757
               regulatoryquality    -.4607049   .5590705    -0.82   0.417    -1.607823     .686413
politicalstabilityandabsenceofvi    -1.273931   .3356385    -3.80   0.001    -1.962605   -.5852578
         governmenteffectiveness    -.1690605   .4890751    -0.35   0.732     -1.17256    .8344387
             controlofcorruption    -.0199704   .4678941    -0.04   0.966    -.9800098     .940069
           riskofsocialexclusion    -.0068708   .0227367    -0.30   0.765    -.0535227    .0397811
                            gini    -.0186157   .0302468    -0.62   0.543     -.080677    .0434456
                       eduexpend    -.2135001   .1618026    -1.32   0.198    -.5454916    .1184915
                      corruption     .2029724   .1937467     1.05   0.304     -.194563    .6005078
                                                                                                  
                           resid        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                 Robust
                                                                                                  
                                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in Country)
                                                       Root MSE      =  .58973
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4648
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 10,    27) =    6.74
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     252
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